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S u m m a r y
California has short- and long-term labor market problems—there were steep employ-ment declines during the recent recession, and the state’s unemployment rate is persis-tently higher than the national average. Recent job losses have led to proposals for state 
policies to spur job creation. This report examines two “direct” job creation policies: subsidies 
to employers to hire workers (“hiring credits”) and subsidies to individuals to enter the labor 
market (“worker subsidies”). Hiring credits act to increase the demand for labor, and worker 
subsidies aim to increase labor supply. Under normal circumstances, either policy should 
lead to higher employment. However, short- and long-term goals turn out to be of critical 
concern when considering the effectiveness of each policy. 
In the short term, when recovery from the recession is the paramount goal, hiring cred-
its are likely to be the better policy response. To be most effective, hiring credits should 
focus broadly on the recently unemployed and establish incentives for new hires rather than 
increases in the work hours of existing employees. In the longer term, when the labor market 
has recovered more fully from the recession and the focus can shift to the persistently higher 
unemployment in California, greater reliance on worker subsidies—most likely in the form of 
a state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)—would prove beneficial. 
Either program would be costly to implement. Rough calculations suggest that the cost 
per job created using worker subsidies would be $12,000 to $207,000, and the cost for hir-
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ing credits would be $9,100 to $75,000. These cost ranges do not take into account other 
fiscal or macroeconomic benefits associated with these policies, including such difficult-to- 
measure effects as reducing expenditures on unemployment insurance and welfare pay-
ments, increasing tax receipts, or stimulating the economy—all of which could lower the 
ultimate costs of these programs. But even if program costs were lower, feasible levels of 
state funding would at best contribute only modestly toward helping California’s labor mar-
ket recover from the recession.
Still, there may be good reason to pursue these policies, with short- and long-term goals 
in mind. If policymakers want to confront the aftermath of the recent recession, hiring credits 
can be made more cost-effective by using simple program rules and setting a relatively low 
hurdle for employers to claim the credit. When the state’s economy and budget situation 
improve, the beneficial effects of a state EITC for low-income families might offset the EITC’s 
greater cost per job produced. California might best follow other states and specify the EITC 
as an add-on to the federal EITC. 
When the economy is strong, the state may want to rely less on hiring credits and more 
on worker subsidies to spur job creation. But to prepare for future recessions, a flexible 
approach may be best. California could create a hiring credit program that remains on the 
books permanently—one that aggressively rewards the hiring of unemployed workers dur-
ing economic downturns but “turns off” during better economic times.
 Please visit the report’s publication page to find related resources:  
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=939
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Introduction
California has both short-term and long-term labor market 
problems. Of course, the short-term problem has received 
most attention lately. Job creation began to slow in 2007 
and declined sharply in 2008 and 2009 in both California 
and the United States as a whole. However, in addition 
to these short-term cyclical changes, the unemployment 
rate is persistently higher in California (Figure 1).1 Thus, 
although the scale of the recent job losses and the increase 
in the unemployment rate are striking, California’s long-
term unemployment problems suggest that policy debate 
about job creation policies should not focus solely on the 
short-term response to the recession.
This conclusion is reinforced by two facts. First, the 
state’s current budget problems limit any short-term 
response. Second, the recent recession was sufficiently 
severe that even the best state policies would likely lead only 
to incremental changes; recovery from the recession in the 
state will require recovery at the national and international 
levels as well. State policy may be able to make a bigger dent 
in California’s long-term unemployment problem. 
This report focuses on two “direct” job creation poli-
cies that aim to increase employment by lowering the cost 
of labor. The first is subsidies to employers to hire work-
ers (“hiring credits”). Hiring credits effectively subsidize 
wages when employers hire from particular groups of 
workers. Because these credits lower the cost of labor to 
firms, they increase the demand for labor.2 The second is 
subsidies to individuals to enter the labor market (“worker 
subsidies”). Worker subsidies raise the effective wage that 
people earn from working, hence encouraging people 
to work and increasing labor supply. Economic theory 
predicts that, under normal circumstances, either policy 
should lead to higher employment. However, their actual 
effects may differ. As we shall see, hiring credits may be 
the best option for addressing California’s short-term labor 
problem. But for the long term, worker subsidies are likely 
to be more effective. 
To be clear, hiring credits or worker subsidies are not 
the only ways to spur job creation, nor are they necessar-
ily the best way to do so. But they have the most direct 
effect on the behavior of either workers or firms that leads 
to more employment, and hence there is good reason to 
believe that these policies are likely to be the most effective 
at job creation.3 
Certainly, state policymakers have proposed many pol-
icies that might create jobs. Examples include sales and use 
Recovery from the recession in the state 
will require recovery at the national and 
international levels as well. 
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Figure 1. The recession hit California hard, but state unemployment 
is persistently higher than the national rate
SOURCES: Data  in  the top panel are based on the Current Employment Statistics payroll survey;  data in
 the bottom panel are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey.
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Ja
n–
91
Ja
n–
91
Ja
n–
93
Ja
n–
95
Ja
n–
97
Ja
n–
99
Ja
n–
01
Ja
n–
07
Ja
n–
05
Ja
n–
03
Ja
n–
09
Ja
n–
92
Ja
n–
94
Ja
n–
96
Ja
n–
98
Ja
n–
00
Ja
n–
02
Ja
n–
08
Ja
n–
06
Ja
n–
04
Ja
n–
10
Unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Se
p–
93
Ma
y–
92
Ja
n–
95
Se
p–
97
Ma
y–
96
Ja
n–
99
Se
p–
01
Ma
y–
00
Ja
n–
03
Se
p–
05
Ma
y–
04
Ja
n–
07
Se
p–
09
Ma
y–
08
How Can California Spur Job Creation?4
www.ppic.org
tax exemptions for manufacturing, corporate tax reduc-
tions and reforms, a new state enterprise zone, reducing 
regulations, development of high speed rail, more school 
construction, lower capital gains taxes, and hiring credits 
for welfare recipients, veterans, and the unemployed.4  
However, this report does not consider these policies or 
any other “indirect” job creation policies. Indirect policies 
change the economic incentives facing businesses or work-
ers. They may increase employment, but in terms of the 
underlying economics, they do not directly target increases 
in the aggregate level of employment, and in some cases 
they may not increase employment at all. 
For example, enterprise zones target employment 
growth in particular locations, rather than statewide, and 
may lead to employment growth in one place offset at least 
in part by employment declines in others or, as Kolko and 
Neumark (2009) find for California, may fail to create 
jobs altogether. Subsidizing business activities other than 
hiring, such as investment in machinery, could reduce 
employment by lowering the price of capital relative to 
labor. And policies that favor businesses generally—such 
as reducing taxes or regulatory costs—should help those 
businesses become more profitable and expand their 
workforces; but such policies do not necessarily reduce the 
relative price of labor, so the cost per job “produced” from 
such policies may be quite high.5 
For the following discussion of hiring credits and 
worker subsidies, it is critical to understand clearly what 
“job creation” entails. In no way should it be inferred that 
a job created by either a hiring credit or a worker subsidy 
is permanent. People leave and enter jobs and the labor 
market frequently, particularly low-skilled individuals who 
would be the targets of either policy. But even if low-skilled 
individuals enter jobs that tend to be of short duration, if 
a policy leads to the creation of more such jobs or encour-
ages more low-skilled individuals to look for work, then 
the economy will have a higher share of its population 
employed at any point in time—which can lead to a higher 
long-term level of employment.
The distinction between short- and long-term solutions 
to California’s labor market problems marks an impor-
tant theme throughout this report. Typically, job creation 
policies have more to do with smoothing out the business 
cycle, making the declines in employment and increases 
in unemployment less severe. This is true, for example, of 
a hiring credit policy that encourages employers to hire 
unemployed workers, because there will be more such 
unemployed workers during and just after a recession. 
(And it is certainly true of the recent federal stimulus pack-
age.) In contrast, the federal Earned Income Tax Credit—
the principal worker subsidy discussed in this report—has 
been maintained continuously since its adoption and, for 
reasons discussed below, may increase employment over 
the long run despite being relatively ineffective at coun-
tering recessions. These differences in the timing—or 
“dynamics”—of the effects of hiring credits and worker 
subsidies inform the recommendations this report makes 
regarding the job creation policies California might adopt.
The remainder of the report proceeds as follows. 
First, hiring credit policies are discussed and reviewed in 
detail. Then, the predicted effects of these credits and—
most important—the existing evidence on their effects 
are discussed. A similar discussion of worker subsidies 
follows. With the groundwork laid, arguments in favor 
of one policy or the other are presented and evaluated, 
including the costs of job creation under each policy and 
their relative effectiveness in addressing the short-term 
response to the recession and the long-term response to 
high unemployment in California. Next, the costs of these 
policies are estimated in light of the recent federal stimulus 
expenditures, to provide some guidance as to how much 
effect these programs—hiring credits in particular—could 
Typically, job creation policies have more  
to do with smoothing out the business cycle, 
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realistically have in terms of helping the state recover from 
the recession. Finally, some specific recommendations for 
making either policy more effective are discussed, followed 
by some more general recommendations for policies the 
state might consider in both the short and long term. 
Hiring Credits
Hiring credits subsidize wages when employers hire from 
particular groups of workers. To a large extent, federal 
hiring credits have focused more on encouraging hiring 
among hard-to-employ groups than on countering down-
turns in the business cycle. In the past, Job Opportuni-
ties in the Business Sector (JOBS) targeted young disad-
vantaged workers, and the Work Incentives Tax Credit 
(WINTC) targeted Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) recipients. Other federal credits that targeted 
these groups and other disadvantaged individuals have 
included the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), the Work 
Opportunities and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credits (WOTC 
and WtWTC, which remain in place), and the Job Training 
and Partnership Act (JTPA).
Using hiring credits to combat recessions has been less 
common. The federal New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) was 
enacted to counter the recession of the mid-1970s; it did 
not target particular groups but instead was “noncategori-
cal.”6 The very recent Hiring Incentives to Restore Employ-
ment (HIRE) Act targets those who have been unemployed 
or who are entering employment from out of the labor 
force, offering a reduction in the employer’s payroll tax 
burden for much of 2010. However, the HIRE Act does not 
explicitly target job creation by, for example, rewarding 
hiring only in growing firms. 
States make extensive use of hiring credits. Table 1 
lists current federal policies and examples of state poli-
cies. Some states (Florida and Maryland) focus on the 
unemployed, as does the federal HIRE Act. Others couple 
hiring credits with requirements for investment in facilities 
(Delaware) or training (Iowa). Some states tie the credit to 
what the new jobs pay. And almost all try to ensure that 
the credits are paid for new job creation.7 Only a handful of 
states (including Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
New York, and Rhode Island) currently have hiring credits 
targeting the disadvantaged, which is the focus of federal 
hiring credits.
California enacted a hiring credit (the New Jobs 
Credit, or NJC) in 2009. The NJC targets small businesses 
generally, rather than the disadvantaged or the unem-
ployed (Table 2).8 Hiring credit proposals in California in 
the past year have included expanding the employer size 
cutoff for eligibility for the NJC and targeting the unem-
ployed or narrow, disadvantaged groups.
How Do They Work?
Economic theory predicts that a hiring credit will boost 
employment. Without a hiring credit, initial employment 
and wages are determined by the intersection of the labor 
demand and labor supply curves. Because a hiring credit 
reduces the effective wage paid by employers, it increases 
labor demand—meaning that employers would like to hire 
more workers than they would in the absence of the credit. 
This shift in labor demand leads to higher employment 
and also increases the wages paid to workers (which is why 
Hiring credits increase labor demand by reducing the effective wage paid 
by employers.
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more are now willing to work). However, the wage cost 
to the employer is less than the wage paid to the worker, 
with the difference exactly equal to the hiring credit. This 
simple logic probably underlies the perception that hiring 
credits are the most effective way to spur job creation. 
In practice, however, complications can reduce— 
perhaps substantially—the effects of hiring credits.9 First, 
because the goal of hiring credits is to create incentives 
for employers to create jobs, a well-designed hiring credit 
tries to reward increases in employment that would not 
have otherwise occurred. This is difficult to accomplish. 
Research makes clear that a substantial share—often as 
high as 90 percent of total hiring credit payments— 
pays for hiring that would have occurred anyway; these 
Table 1. Hiring credit programs, 2010 
a. Federal
HIRE Act Exemption from employer share of Social Security taxes (6.2%) for March–December 2010; $1,000 tax credit per worker for 
workers unemployed or not employed (for more than 40 hours total) in 60 days before being hired, for those hired into new 
positions or into existing positions if the previous worker left voluntarily or for cause 
WOTC Varying maximum credit amounts for long-term and other recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
veterans, recipients of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits, residents of designated communities, summer 
youth, the disabled, ex-felons, Supplemental Security Income recipients, Katrina “employees,” and disconnected youths hired 
for a two-year period; credit is a percentage of qualified wages, which are capped (percentage and cap differ by group)
B. States (examples)
Connecticut New Jobs Creation Tax 
Credit
Discretionary tax credit up to 60 percent of the income tax for taxpayers that create and 
maintain at least 10 full-time new jobs 
Delaware Blue Collar Job Act Credits up to 50 percent of firm’s tax liability for eligible businesses that are engaged in a 
qualified activity, hire five or more qualified employees, and invest at least $200,000 ($40,000 
per qualified employee) in a qualified facility; also $400 corporate income tax credit per 
employee and per $100,000 investment
Florida Jobs for the Unemployed 
Tax Credit Program 
Tax credit of $1,000 for each new hire who was previously unemployed for a minimum of 
30 days and remains employed after a 12-month period at an average of 36 hours per week 
Georgia Quality Jobs Credit Credit of $2,500–$5,000 per job per year, for up to five years, for companies that create at least 
50 jobs with salaries of at least 110 percent of the county average; credit rises with ratio of salary 
to county average, from $2,500 for 110–120 percent of county average to $5,000 for 200 percent 
or more of county average
Illinois Small Business Job Creation 
Tax Credit
$2,500 tax credit for employers with 50 or fewer total employees who hire new, full-time Illinois 
employees for new, full-time jobs sustained for at least one year; job must pay at least $25,000 
per year 
Iowa New Jobs Tax Credit Credit for businesses entering into jobs training agreement with a community college, and 
increasing base employment level by at least 10 percent; credit is 6 percent of qualifying wages 
Maryland Job Creation and Recovery 
Tax Credit
Credit up to $5,000 for hiring individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits or who 
exhausted benefits in the previous 12 months and were not working full time immediately 
preceding the date of hire; hiring into full-time positions that are new or have been vacant for 
at least 6 months 
Rhode 
Island
Hiring of Unemployed or 
Low-Income Residents
Credit of 40 percent (up to maximum of $2,400) for newly hired state residents previously 
unemployed or receiving public assistance; worker must have been unemployed for at least  
26 consecutive weeks before being hired and either received public assistance for at least one 
year or received unemployment benefits at any time during the prior 52 weeks 
West 
Virginia
Corporate Headquarters 
Credit
Tax credit offsetting up to 100 percent of tax liability for companies that relocate corporate 
headquarters to West Virginia and create 15 new jobs (including relocating employees) 
Note: Currently, more than 40 states have statewide hiring credits (excluding statewide but not local enterprise zones).
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payments are “windfalls” for employers.10 Thus, policy-
makers usually end up imposing administrative require-
ments on firms claiming hiring credits to try to identify 
new hiring, and the cost of complying with these require-
ments can deter firms from using the program.11 
The second complication arises when hiring credits are 
targeted at disadvantaged workers—as they often are. The 
targeting of hiring credits on disadvantaged workers can 
“stigmatize” them. When workers signal their eligibility 
for a hiring credit, they simultaneously tell employers that 
they have low qualifications and have not, in the past, suc-
ceeded in the labor market. Employers are therefore likely 
to regard these eligible workers as less productive. Research 
indicates that, as a result, hiring credits that stigmatize 
workers can weaken or even eliminate the incentive to hire 
the very workers for whom the hiring credit is supposed 
to spur employment (Katz 1998). Moreover, documenting 
the eligibility of workers based on disadvantaged status can 
also entail administrative costs.
How Effective Are They?
Much of the past research on the effects of hiring cred-
its focuses on credits targeting the disadvantaged.12 This 
research establishes some important findings about hiring 
credits that bear on their design and implementation, espe-
cially regarding the consequences of administrative costs 
and stigma effects. However, research on hiring credits 
used to counter recessions—in particular, the NJTC, which 
was in effect from mid-1977 to the end of 1978 to help spur 
economic recovery after the recession of the early 1970s—
may be more relevant in thinking about policy responses 
to the recent recession. 
In programs targeting the disadvantaged—such as 
JOBS and WINTC—a fairly small share of potential federal 
hiring credits is actually claimed by employers. Some inter-
pret this low uptake as evidence of the detrimental effect 
of the high administrative costs involved with claiming 
hiring credits (Katz 1998). In contrast, the more broadly 
targeted NJTC was more likely to be claimed by employ-
ers.13 Because the NJTC did not specifically target only 
disadvantaged groups, it may have entailed smaller admin-
istrative costs for employers. 
Evidence that the NJTC was more effective at larger 
firms (Perloff and Wachter 1979) is also consistent with 
evidence on the importance of administrative costs. These 
costs likely have a large fixed component that can be spread 
over more workers at large firms. This finding suggests, 
therefore, that the effectiveness of California’s NJC may be 
Table 2. California’s current and proposed hiring credit progams 
a. Current
New Jobs Credit (2009) $3,000 per full-time employee (one working more than 35 hours a week for the whole year, 
otherwise prorated) hiring credit to small employers (fewer than 20 employees to start) that 
increase the number of full-time employees; credit capped at $400 million (cumulatively) 
B. Proposed
Governor’s job package (State of the State, 
2010)
$3,000 reimbursement for hiring previously unemployed Californians
SB 59 (Work Opportunity Tax Credit, R) Tax credit to employer to hire someone in the California Work Opportunities and Responsibility 
for Kids (CalWORKs) program, parolees, probationers, veterans, or unemployment insurance 
benefit recipients
SB 63 (Veterans Hiring Tax Credit, R) 25 percent tax credit up to $6,000 of first year wages for each recently discharged and 
unemployed veteran hired and retained at least 120 hours 
AB 2630 (Investment Tax Credit, R) Expands NJC definition of qualified employer to 50 or fewer employees, retaining the  
$400 million cap and other features of NJC
AB 1973 (Re-Entry Tax Credit for Business, D) Hiring credit up to $5,000 for first and second year of employment of ex-offenders convicted  
of a (nonsexual, nonviolent) felony
Notes: senate Bill (sB) numbers listed are for 8th extraordinary session. “R” or “D” denotes that the bill was introduced by a Republican or Democratic member. AB is Assembly Bill.
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limited by targeting small firms. Moreover, high utilization 
of a program makes job creation more likely but does not 
guarantee it. For example, many claims under the TJTC 
were spurred by management assistance companies that 
helped employers file claims retroactively for eligible work-
ers they had hired (Lorenz 1995).
There is stronger evidence on the detrimental aspects 
of stigma effects. Stigma effects can go so far as to elimi-
nate the effects of hiring credits for narrow target popula-
tions. In an experimental program for welfare recipients, 
under the TJTC, one group received vouchers to present to 
employers for direct cash rebate subsidies; a second group 
received vouchers that let employers claim hiring credits 
under existing programs; and a third group was eligible 
for the same credits but neither received vouchers to give 
to employers nor were told that they were eligible. As it 
turns out, the third group had the most success in finding 
employment (Burtless 1985), likely confirming the adverse 
stigma effects for the other two groups.14 
Despite stigma effects and administrative costs, what 
does the research literature say more generally about 
whether hiring credits boost employment? Hiring credits 
that target the disadvantaged can be effective at increasing 
employment for some groups, although often they are not. 
Moreover, when they boost employment, it is because they 
are combined with other efforts to help the targeted popu-
lation find and keep jobs, through such efforts as job search 
assistance and job development.15 Research also indicates 
that hiring credits targeting the disadvantaged do rela-
tively little to increase the incomes of low-income families, 
because there are many nonpoor families with low-wage 
workers, and many poor families have no workers.16 
Evidence on the effectiveness of the NJTC is more 
positive, perhaps because the NJTC avoided stigma effects 
by not targeting the disadvantaged and entailed lower 
administrative costs.17 Firms that reported knowing about 
the NJTC had significantly higher employment growth 
(Perloff and Wachter 1979). However, this does not prove 
that the NJTC boosted employment growth, because firms 
where employment was growing may have had a “greater 
incentive to learn about the program” (Katz 1998, p. 31). 
Based on variation in employment growth when the credit 
was implemented, the NJTC appears to have increased 
employment in construction, trucking, retail, and whole-
sale trade by about 400,000 jobs, or about 0.5 percent of 
economy-wide employment (Bishop 1981).18 However, it is 
not easy to sort out the effects of other aggregate changes 
affecting these industries from the effects of the NJTC.
A cautious conclusion, based on this evidence, suggests 
that the NJTC was effective at creating jobs, stating that a 
“temporary, noncategorical, incremental [worker] subsidy 
has some potential for stimulating employment growth” 
(Katz 1998, p. 31). This cautious conclusion echoes the 
authors of the original studies.19 Recently, researchers call-
ing for a federal hiring credit to counter the recent reces-
sion have argued, referring to the same body of evidence, 
that the evidence on the NJTC is unambiguously positive, 
arguing that “tax credits for new jobs have been tried 
before, and they worked well” (Bartik and Bishop 2009, 
p. 9), and that “the NJTC probably generated at least a mil-
lion jobs by the end of 1978” (Bishop 2008, p. 5). Based on 
the evidence, however, the more cautious summary of the 
evidence along the line of Katz’s is more defensible.20 
In weighing the evidence, it is important to keep in 
mind that the NJTC was used over 30 years ago, which 
introduces considerably uncertainty in extrapolating 
results to the present. Furthermore, none of the existing 
evidence comes explicitly from state hiring credit policies,  
which introduces yet another source of uncertainty in try- 
ing to predict the likely effects of a hiring credit in Cali-
fornia. But the relatively pessimistic conclusions about the 
effectiveness of hiring credits apply to programs that target 
the disadvantaged. A broadly focused hiring credit pro-
gram that targets the recently unemployed and intends to 
counteract a recession may be more effective. 
Worker Subsidies
In contrast to hiring credits, worker subsidies encourage 
people to work by supplementing labor market earnings 
with additional income. At the federal level, the EITC plays 
9How Can California Spur Job Creation?
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this role, by subsidizing the employment of workers in 
low-income families. In 2010, the EITC paid a 40 percent 
subsidy on the initial earnings of families with two quali-
fying children; if, for example, the family earned $10,000 
in the labor market, the EITC brought income to $14,000. 
This subsidy increases over the “phase-in range,” up to a 
maximum credit (in 2010, $5,036 for families with two 
children). There is then a “plateau”—an income range over 
which the maximum benefit remains fixed. Finally, there 
is a “phase-out” range over which the credit is reduced 
by 21.06 percent of earnings until, at an income level of 
$40,363 for a family with two children, benefits have been 
eliminated. For families with one child, the subsidies are 
smaller, and there is a very small EITC available to those 
without children.21 Many states also have their own EITCs, 
usually as a supplement to the federal EITC (Table 3). Cali-
fornia has never had its own EITC, although proposals to 
establish one have been considered in the past (Table 4). 
How Do They Work?
In contrast to a hiring credit, which increases labor 
demand, the EITC increases labor supply. Because the 
EITC raises a worker’s effective wage (the market wage 
plus the EITC subsidy), it encourages people to work. For 
example, faced with a market wage of $8 an hour and no 
EITC subsidy, a single mother with two children may be 
better off if she does not work, given the costs of child  
care, clothes for work, and commuting. However, with a  
40 percent supplement that brings her effective wage to 
$11.20, work may become more attractive. 
Although it may seem counterintuitive, increasing 
the supply of labor to the market can—just like a hiring 
credit—increase employment. Before the worker subsidy 
is put into place, initial employment and wages are—
again—determined by the intersection of labor supply and 
demand. The worker subsidy shifts labor supply, increasing 
how many people are willing to work at any wage—since 
workers receive a subsidy from the government for work-
ing, more of them are willing to work (or to work more) 
at any given market wage than they were in the absence 
of the EITC. Note that the market wage declines, owing 
to the increased number of people working, which is why 
employers are willing to hire more workers. But the work-
er’s take-home wage—defined as the market wage plus 
the worker subsidy, is higher than the initial wage. Thus, 
although perhaps not as intuitively simple, the EITC acts 
just like a hiring credit—lowering labor costs to employers 
and increasing employment (and workers’ pay). 
However, just as in the case of hiring credits, complica-
tions arise that can undermine this process. In the case of 
the EITC, the main issue is the interplay of employment 
among family members. Some people may enter the labor 
market because of the EITC, but others may reduce the 
number of hours they work. Or some spouses of employed 
people (in contrast to single heads of household) may exit 
the labor market altogether. These effects arise in families 
in which earnings are above the phase-in range, because 
above the phase-in range, the EITC either gives families an 
amount of income that does not change with earnings (on 
the plateau) or reduces their income as earnings increase 
(in the phase-out range). Economic theory predicts that, 
for these families, there may be an incentive to reduce 
hours or, equivalently, for a secondary worker in the family 
to leave the workforce. 
The complex effects of the EITC reflect the fact that it 
is not intended as a pure job creation policy. Rather, it is 
intended to increase the likelihood that low-income single 
women work. For this population, there is a clear predic-
tion that employment will increase,22 and more generally 
the EITC will increase incomes in low-income families. 
But there is no way to avoid the incentives that the EITC 
creates for those already employed (or who are secondary 
workers) to work less, because EITC benefits have to be 
Although it may seem counterintuitive, 
increasing the supply of labor  
to the market can—just like a hiring credit—
increase employment. 
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Table 3. The federal EITC and selected state EITC programs, 2010
a. Federal EITC, 2010
3 or more children 2 children 1 child No children
Phase-in rate (% subsidy to earnings) 45% 40% 34% 7.65%
Maximum credit $5,666 $5,036 $3,050 $457
Income at which maximum credit is reached $12,590 $12,590 $8,970 $5,980
Income at which phase-out begins $16,450 $16,450 $16,450 $7,480
Phase-out rate (% reduction in credit with additional 
earnings) 21.06% 21.06% 15.98% 7.65%
Income at which credit is eliminated $43,352 $40,363 $35,535 $13,460
B. State EITCs, 2009
Percentage of federal EITC
Delaware 20% (nonrefundable)
District of Columbia 40%
Illinois 5%
Indiana 9%
Iowa 7%
Kansas 17%
Louisiana 3.5%
Maine 5% (up to $125 refundable for joint filers)
Maryland 50% nonrefundable or 25% refundable
Massachusetts 15%
Michigan 20%
Minnesota Varies with number of children, averages 33%
Nebraska 10%
New Jersey 25%
New Mexico 10%
New York 30%
North Carolina 5%
Oklahoma 5%
Oregon 6%
Rhode Island 25% (nonrefundable, but 15% of amount is refundable)
Vermont 32%
Virginia 20% (nonrefundable)
Wisconsin 4% (1 child), 14% (2 children), 43% (3 or more children)
Notes: In Panel A, the separate credit for three or more children is a temporary measure for the 2009 and 2010 tax years, included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, after which the numbers for 
families with two children apply to families with two or more children. Numbers shown are for those filing singly. Phase-in and phase-out rates are the same for those filing jointly; incomes at which the phase-out 
rate begins and incomes at which the credit is eliminated are higher by $5,010 for those filing jointly. In Panel B, if not noted, state eItC is refundable. the dollar amounts are indexed. 
souRCes: tax Policy Center, urban Institute, and Brookings Institution (www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm); state eItC online Resource Center (www.stateeitc.com/map/index.asp).
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phased out as income rises. These adverse work incentives, 
plus the payment of EITC benefits to many workers who 
are employed anyway, parallel the potential problem of 
windfalls in hiring credit programs—that is, costs of the 
program that do not contribute to increased employment. 
How Effective Are They?
Much of the empirical research on the EITC has focused 
on single mothers, for whom this program is most likely to 
increase employment. The evidence is overwhelming that, 
as predicted by theory, a higher EITC increases employ-
ment for this group. Most of this evidence focuses on the 
federal EITC, although some of it also comes from evi-
dence on state supplements to the federal program.23 
Studies have also examined labor supply effects among 
those already working and, in particular, secondary work-
ers in families. The evidence is generally consistent with 
the prediction that work will decrease among these groups, 
although estimates vary from no effect to sizable effects.24 
Many studies have evaluated the effects of the 1993 
expansion of the federal EITC. These studies suggest 
that this policy change raised the employment rate of 
low-skilled single mothers by 18 to 23 percentage points 
(Ellwood 2000) and the employment rate of single moth-
ers overall by about 6 to 7 percentage points (Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2001).25 In contrast, the employment rate of 
less-educated married men increased very slightly, and the 
employment rate of less-educated married women declined 
by just over 1 percentage point (Eissa and Hoynes 2004). 
Paralleling the literature on the federal EITC, evidence 
on state EITCs finds that the strongest and largest effects 
are the positive effects on the employment of single moth-
ers (Neumark and Wascher forthcoming). Further, there is 
no evidence that the state EITCs reduced the employment 
or hours worked of married women, although there are 
negative consequences for other groups who compete with 
single mothers for employment. 
It is more difficult to estimate the overall effects of the 
EITC on labor supply. Research indicates that, on net, the 
EITC increases the total number of hours worked.26 Some 
find that when the federal EITC expanded sharply between 
1993 and 1998, weeks worked among single women with 
children rose substantially relative to married women with 
children and single women without children (Blank, Card, 
and Robins 2000). This evidence is not only consistent with 
the positive employment effects for single mothers noted 
above but also suggests that, for women, the net effect of 
the EITC on the total amount of labor supplied to the mar-
ket is positive, with the increased number of work weeks 
associated with positive employment effects among single 
mothers outweighing any reductions in hours among those 
who were already working.27 
Overall, then, there is a fairly strong consensus that 
the EITC has positive job creation effects—increasing the 
number of people employed. If that is the main or the only 
goal of policy, then the reductions in the number of hours 
worked of those already employed may be regarded as 
unimportant. However, the combined evidence suggests 
Table 4. Proposed EITC legislation in California
Legislative session Bill Description
1999–2000 AB 1854
Refundable Earned Income Credit (EIC) equal to 15 percent of the federal EITC
1999–2000 SB 1421
2000–2001 AB 106
2003–2004 SB 224
1999–2000 AB 2466 Nonrefundable EIC in an amount equal to an unspecified percentage of the federal EITC 
2007–2008 AB 21 Nonrefundable state EITC equal to 4 percent of taxable income for low- and moderate-income taxpayers, 
up to maximum of $200 per year
Note: All of the eItC bills were introduced by Democratic legislators.
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that even if these reductions in hours are taken into account, 
the EITC increases the total amount of labor supplied to the 
market. And although the direct evidence on state EITCs is 
more sparse, it appears that this conclusion applies at least as 
strongly to the state EITCs as to the federal EITC. 
The EITC has the added benefits—from most peoples’ 
perspective—of raising the incomes of poor and low-
income families.28 But recent research has highlighted 
some potential negative consequences of the EITC for 
other groups. Because the employment-increasing effects 
of the EITC for some groups increase competition with 
those already in the labor market, the EITC can reduce the 
income and employment of low-skilled workers ineligible 
for the EITC.29 However, evidence on the effects of state 
EITCs suggests that the positive employment effect for less- 
educated single mothers with children is about six times as 
large as the negative employment effect for less-educated 
childless individuals and about 2.4 times as large as the 
negative employment effect for less-educated childless 
blacks and Hispanics.30 These negative consequences for 
workers who compete with the main beneficiaries of this 
policy need to be included when weighing the costs and 
benefits of the EITC but, overall, the positive effects far 
outweigh the negative. 
In sum, worker subsidies in the form of an EITC 
have two benefits. They induce people to take jobs, which 
increases employment. And in so doing, these subsidies 
increase the incomes of poor and low-income families. 
However, as the next section discusses, these conclusions 
do not imply that worker subsidies are necessarily prefer-
able to hiring credits as a job creation strategy, especially 
for the short-term policy goal of helping California recover 
from the recent recession. 
Hiring Credits Versus Worker 
Subsidies
As already explained, both hiring credits and worker subsi-
dies can spur job creation.31 The evidence generally sug-
gests that both policies accomplish this goal. This section 
synthesizes the existing evidence to consider the arguments 
in favor of each policy. This discussion suggests that deter-
mining which policy is preferable may depend on what is 
considered: the short-term response to the recession and 
its aftermath or long-term efforts to increase employment 
and reduce unemployment. Finally, it summarizes what 
we know about the cost-effectiveness of the two policies in 
creating jobs—that is, the cost per job created. 
Reasons to Favor Worker Subsidies
Worker subsidies have the advantage of avoiding the 
stigma effects and administrative costs of hiring credits. 
The EITC does not have stigma effects because, in contrast 
to hiring credits, employers typically have no idea that an 
employee is eligible for the EITC. And the EITC is eas-
ily administered through the tax code.32 A state EITC is 
particularly simple when it “piggybacks” on the federal 
EITC calculation from the federal tax return, as most state 
EITCs do. This is reflected in state EITC tax forms, which 
just require a few items from the federal tax form and the 
federal EITC calculation.33 In contrast, states have chosen 
very heterogeneous hiring credits, and there appear to be 
no state hiring credit programs that supplement federal 
credits in a simple way. Instead, employers have to certify 
The main beneficiaries of the EITC are low-skilled single mothers and  
their families. 
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eligibility for credits with state tax authorities, likely entail-
ing substantial administrative costs.
Worker subsidies like the EITC also have better effects 
in terms of helping poor and low-income families. The one 
other existing study that presents a thorough comparison of 
worker subsidies and hiring credits emphasizes the benefi-
cial effects of the EITC on the income distribution (Dickert-
Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 2000, p. 269). This study also 
comes down on the side of using worker subsidies for job 
creation. However, this conclusion is based on evidence on 
the effects of hiring credits on the employment of disadvan-
taged workers, for which, as discussed above, hiring credits 
are quite ineffective. The evidence suggests that a non-
categorical hiring credit such as the NJTC—focused more 
on the unemployed in general rather than on disadvantaged 
workers, and created to respond to a recession—has greater 
potential to create jobs. 
Reasons to Favor Hiring Credits 
Despite the disadvantages of hiring credits discussed 
above, they may be a more effective job creation policy 
than worker subsidies—at least in the short term. Dur-
ing a recession, the overriding concern of policymakers is 
surely putting more people back to work and lowering the 
unemployment rate. As a result, any state effort to enhance 
or broaden hiring credits would (or at least should) focus 
on the unemployed rather than on specific disadvantaged 
groups. A hiring credit focused broadly on the unemployed 
could substantially mitigate the stigma effects and admin-
istrative costs that have diluted the effectiveness of past 
hiring credit programs. 
First, stigma effects would likely be less severe with a 
broad-based hiring credit. To illustrate: A hiring credit for 
ex-felons may reduce the cost of hiring ex-felons relative to 
other workers, but by signaling ex-felon status it may reduce 
employment for this group. In contrast, with national unem-
ployment hovering near 10 percent (12% in California), eli-
gibility for a hiring credit based on current unemployment 
may not send employers much of a bad signal—everyone 
understands that many people have become unemployed in 
the current downturn through no fault of their own. 
Second, in a period when employment has largely been 
falling (and is now growing slowly), it should be easier to 
reward hiring that would not have occurred but for the 
credit, reducing windfalls for firms that would be hiring 
anyway.34 For example, in the current environment, basing 
eligibility simply on whether a firm’s employment is grow-
ing might pose acceptable windfall costs, and such a simple 
rule for establishing eligibility would impose smaller costs 
on firms, making the credit more effective. Similarly, a credit 
targeting the recently unemployed should be administra-
tively simple, as it is easy to verify unemployment status.
Third, although worker subsidies allow for the greater 
concentration of benefits on poor and low-income families, 
in the near term such priorities may merit less emphasis. 
Policies—such as the EITC—that aim in part to redistribute 
income to low-income families focus attention on female-
headed families with children, which are vastly overrepre-
sented among the poor. However, the recent recession has 
had substantially greater adverse effects on men than on 
women. In both California and the United States, employ-
ment growth slowed and the unemployment rate rose 
much more sharply for men than for women after 2007 
(Figure 2).35 This suggests that a state EITC would do little 
to help the group most hurt by the recent recession. Thus, 
in the near term, a policy that redirects more of the benefits 
toward men may be called for. A hiring credit—and in par-
ticular one focused on the unemployed—would do this.
Finally, for meeting short-term goals, economic theory 
likely favors hiring credits over an expanded EITC. The 
discussion above of the effects of hiring credits and worker 
A hiring credit focused broadly on the 
unemployed could substantially mitigate  
the stigma effects and administrative costs  
that have diluted the effectiveness of  
past hiring credit programs. 
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subsidies is premised on labor markets “clearing,” meaning 
that employment and wages are determined by the inter-
section of labor supply and demand. But labor markets 
may not clear during recessions. Among economists, the 
more widely held view of recessions—and certainly of the 
recent downturn—is that they are caused when aggregate 
demand in the economy declines and wages do not fall to 
clear the labor market. In this case, increasing labor supply, 
as an EITC would do, does nothing to increase employ-
ment; if wages cannot adjust downward, then increasing 
labor supply does not lower wages paid by employers, so 
employers do not increase hiring.36 Hiring credits, by help-
ing to increase the demand for labor, would be more effec-
tive than worker subsides in this scenario.37 
These arguments favoring hiring credits over worker 
subsidies are more germane to the short-term response 
to the recession. In normal times, policymakers might be 
more inclined to use hiring credits to target the disad- 
vantaged rather than the unemployed more generally— 
targeting that makes hiring credits less effective. In addi-
tion, with the recovery of industries in which men are 
overrepresented, policymakers would likely be more 
inclined to refocus attention on assuring adequate income 
for female-headed households with children. And finally, 
with labor market equilibrium restored, and both aggregate 
labor demand and labor supply determining employment, 
the relative effectiveness of worker subsidies would likely 
increase.
How Much Do These Policies Cost? 
Whether either policy is worth pursuing—and, if so, 
which one—hinges in part on the cost per job created. 
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Figure 2. The recession has hurt men more than women 
 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Annual Averages. 
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Not surprisingly, it is very difficult to estimate these 
costs. And there is no information available on how they 
might differ in the current environment—with very high 
unemployment—and in the long term. The cost estimates 
summarized here are more the result of assumptions and 
back-of-the-envelope calculations than rigorous evidence. 
As such, they can at best provide only a rough guide.
Hiring credits. It is easy to measure dollars paid out 
in hiring credits. But calculating costs per job created 
requires knowing the effects of the credit on job creation. 
Even a hiring credit program deemed particularly effective 
at creating jobs is estimated to have paid out 92 percent 
of credits for jobs that would have been created anyway, 
and the more typical figure may be 96 percent (Bartik and 
Erickcek 2010). The implication is that the cost per job 
created under a hiring credit is much higher than the value 
of the credit paid out when an eligible worker is hired. Of 
course, that does not mean that the costs of hiring credits 
are necessarily prohibitive. The $3,000 credit under Cali-
fornia’s NJC might have to be multiplied by 10 or more to 
get the cost per job created, suggesting a cost of $30,000 or 
more to create a job. 
But this may by a cost policymakers are willing to pay, 
and it may be cheaper than the cost of creating jobs via 
other policies. Most important, perhaps, the jobs created 
may deliver other benefits from stimulating the economy 
and allowing workers to remain employed and retain their 
skills. Although no one claims that the full costs can be 
recouped—or that a hiring credit (or other policy) pays for 
itself—these benefits do lower the net cost of the policy. 
Finally, as suggested above, in a high unemployment 
economy, the “wastage” or “windfalls” associated with 
hiring credits may be reduced, because it is easy to create 
incentives that reward only new hiring.38 
Taking these considerations into account, the range of 
estimates for costs per job created using a hiring credit range 
from about $9,100 to $75,000, and there are reasons to believe 
that the upper range of these cost estimates could be quite 
a bit lower (perhaps by one-half or more) for a hiring credit 
sharply focused on the recently unemployed and used during 
a period in which unemployment remains inordinately high.39 
Worker subsidies. Because of the potentially large 
groups of people who do not increase their employment, 
and may even decrease employment in response to an 
EITC, estimated costs per job created are typically higher, 
but the range of costs is also wider. Based on evidence from 
the effects of both the federal EITC and state EITCs, the 
range of estimates is from about $12,000 to $207,000, with 
a larger body of evidence suggesting a somewhat narrower 
range of $50,000 to $117,000. 
Costs in perspective. These estimates of costs per 
job created by either hiring credits or worker subsidies 
ignore some other potential benefits and hence should be 
viewed as estimates of gross rather than net costs per job 
created. In other words, these policies likely deliver some 
benefits that—either directly or indirectly—imply that the 
policies in part pay for themselves. The net costs of either 
type of policy would be lower to the extent that the added 
employment from a hiring credit reduces other govern-
ment expenditures (such as unemployment insurance 
or welfare benefits) or increases tax receipts. These cost 
savings are likely to be only a fraction of the cost per job 
created described above—but likely not a trivial fraction. 
There also may be long-term benefits to keeping people 
employed and off public benefits, although these are hard 
to estimate.40 Costs could also be lowered if increased 
employment from a hiring credit or a worker subsidy leads 
to stimulative effects on the economy.41 Of course, either 
policy would be financed by taxes, which reduce someone 
else’s income. But to the extent that such a policy transfers 
income to those who spend a higher share of their income 
on current consumption (a higher “marginal propensity 
to consume out of income”), they could have stimulative 
effects leading to additional government revenue. 
These policies likely deliver some benefits 
that—either directly or indirectly—imply that 
the policies in part pay for themselves.
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Given the tremendous uncertainty associated with 
these effects, it is not possible to pin down how much 
lower than gross costs the net costs of these policies would 
be—although clearly they would be lower. Gross costs 
could overstate many-fold the net costs once these other 
offsets are taken into account. For instance, some research 
on hiring credits has estimated the net cost per job cre-
ated to be $4,700 to $6,300—based on estimates of a fairly 
high success rate in creating jobs, along with estimates 
of extra gross domestic product (GDP) and hence higher 
government revenues and lower government expenditures 
that would be created by a hiring credit.42 Even if these 
estimates were two to four times higher—which might be 
more plausible—they would still be well below some of the 
gross cost figures cited above. 
Despite the uncertainty, perhaps the most impor-
tant lesson is that the cost of creating jobs with an EITC, 
in particular, could be very high. As a pure job creation 
strategy intended to counter the recent recession, then, the 
EITC is likely to be inferior to a hiring credit. This conclu-
sion should be tempered, however, because there is simply 
less rigorous evidence on the effects of hiring credits on 
employment, and some of the cost estimates of hiring cred-
its are based on strong conclusions about the success of an 
anti-recessionary hiring credit program from the 1970s 
that may not be justified.
How Much Impact Could Direct 
Job Creation Policies Have? 
As the discussion of costs presented above suggests, imple-
menting direct job creation policies requires considerable 
government investment. How many jobs would these poli-
cies yield in California—and how much would the state need 
to spend? Can California significantly alter the effect of the 
recession—especially given its ongoing budget woes? To gain 
some perspective on these questions, this section examines 
recent federal efforts to counter the recession and estimates 
what kind of effect state spending—particularly through a 
hiring credit program—might have on the labor market.
Federal efforts to counter the recession, and the cost 
per job of these efforts, shed some light on the relative 
magnitudes of the effects of federal spending compared 
to the potential effects of direct job creation policies. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2010) estimates that,  
as of the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2010 (Sep-
tember 2010), $570 billion of the total American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act stimulus funding will have 
been spent. It also estimates that, as of that same quarter, 
employment was higher than it would have been without 
this spending by 1.4 to 3.6 million jobs. Measured this way, 
these figures imply costs per job created of $158,000 to 
$407,000.43 Other studies of the recent stimulus spending 
have found lower costs per job, but for the purposes of this 
report the CBO numbers are most useful.44 
Before comparing the job creation costs of the stimulus 
to those of hiring credits or worker subsidies, we should 
briefly consider how long jobs last.45 If new jobs were going 
to last one year rather than one week, we would presum-
ably place more value on a higher employment level at a 
point in time. To the extent that jobs created by the stimu-
lus are relatively short-term, these jobs might be viewed 
as less valuable—at least compared to those normally 
produced by the private sector.46 However, given that low-
Hiring credits could spur job creation in male-dominated industries (like 
construction) that were  hit hard by the recession. 
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skilled workers have much higher unemployment rates 
than high-skilled workers, it is probably best to think about 
the stimulus as mainly targeting sets of workers similar 
to those targeted by hiring credits and worker subsidies, 
at least when hiring credits focus on the unemployed. The 
jobs created might then be thought of as lasting as long as 
jobs typically last for the relatively low-skilled, implying 
that this consideration would not influence comparisons of 
the costs of creating jobs via the stimulus versus creating 
them with hiring credits or with worker subsidies. 
How does the cost of creating jobs through the federal 
stimulus compare with the costs of hiring credits or worker 
subsidies? The discussion in the previous section suggested 
that the range of estimates per job created using worker 
subsidies is $12,000 to $207,000, and the range for hiring 
credits focused on the unemployed is $9,100 to $75,000 and 
perhaps much lower if we take account of multiplier effects 
(which the CBO estimate does). These ranges suggest that 
it is very likely that the costs of creating jobs via hiring 
credits are much lower than the costs of creating jobs via 
the federal stimulus.47 This is likely also the case for worker 
subsidies, although here the ranges overlap, making this 
comparison less clear unless one is confident that the costs 
of job creation via worker subsidies are at the lower end of 
the range of estimates provided above. 
These comparisons might suggest that California 
could do a lot more to create jobs than the federal stimulus 
could—especially through hiring credits. However, the fis-
cal resources of the federal government, because of its abil-
ity to borrow vast sums, far outweigh the fiscal resources of 
the state government. This is true even in the best of times, 
let alone during California’s current budgetary difficulties. 
To put the federal role in perspective, let us assume 
that the range of job creation effects of the stimulus was 
distributed to California in proportion to its population 
(12%). This puts the range of federal job creation, at a point 
in time, at 168,000 to 396,000. Using these estimates, and 
assuming no other changes, the implication is that without 
the federal stimulus, California’s unemployment rate (in 
November 2010) would have ranged from 13.3 percent to 
14.6 percent, instead of the actual rate of 12.4 percent.48 
But these federal efforts are costly. Assuming that the 
federal stimulus funds spent so far ($570 billion) were also 
distributed in proportion to California’s 12 percent share  
of the U.S. population, California would have received  
$68 billion of the stimulus. Based on midpoints of the esti-
mated costs per job created through each policy, costs break 
down accordingly: $290,000 per job via stimulus spending, 
$110,000 via worker subsidies, and $42,000 via hiring cred-
its. That is, hiring credits—which appear most effective— 
are about 6.9 times more effective than stimulus spending. 
A state hiring credit program would be costly, too. For 
California to get a job creation effect equivalent to that of 
the federal stimulus, the state would have had to spend a 
total $9.9 billion (the estimated federal stimulus spending 
in California, divided by 6.9). There is likely no possibility 
of spending anything near that amount. 
More realistically, suppose that the state spent one-
tenth of this amount, or approximately $1 billion. Using 
the midpoint of the hiring credit estimates of costs per job 
created ($42,000), this would lead to about 24,000 more 
jobs, which would lower the (November 2010) 12.4 percent 
unemployment rate to 12.26 percent, a decline of less than 
two-tenths of a percentage point. If we instead took the low 
estimate of the cost of creating jobs via hiring credits, then 
the spending of $1 billion would create 110,000 jobs, lower-
ing the unemployment rate to 11.8 percent, or a decline of 
six-tenths of a percentage point. 
What these calculations illustrate is that, even under the 
rosiest scenario (a low estimate of the cost of creating jobs 
via hiring credits), the state’s ability to significantly affect 
the labor market is limited. A more cautious view of those 
costs only reinforces this conclusion. This does not imply 
that an aggressive pursuit of job creation through a policy of 
hiring credits (or even worker subsidies) is not worthwhile. 
But there should be no illusion that these policies can do 
It is very likely that the costs of creating jobs  
via hiring credits are much lower than the 
costs of creating jobs via the federal stimulus.
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anything but partially mitigate the effect of the recession. The 
ability of federal policy to counter the cycle is far greater, and, 
of course, the ability of the economy itself to create jobs, as it 
recovers, swamps the effects of either state or federal policy. 
Making Hiring Credits or Worker 
Subsidies More Ef fective 
This analysis of hiring credits and worker subsidies would 
not be complete without some consideration of the imple-
mentation details of each policy.49 The research literature 
and some recent proposals point to ways to make both 
hiring credits and worker subsidies more effective. This 
section summarizes the most important points, including 
proposals for lowering costs. 
With regard to hiring credits, the research suggests a 
number of areas of improvement. First, to reduce windfalls, 
spending on credits can be concentrated during and soon 
after recessionary periods, when, because job growth is 
low (or negative), fewer firms would likely be experiencing 
employment growth absent the hiring credit. Second, hiring 
credits should be short-term and temporary to shift hiring 
into the period in which job growth is subpar. Third, avoiding 
retroactive filing for hiring credits will probably increase the 
likelihood that payments go for hiring that was induced by 
the credit, rather than paying firms for past hiring unrelated 
to the credit. Fourth, hiring credits should create explicit 
incentives for growth in employment, rather than hours 
worked, to minimize costs per job created.50 For example, 
California’s NJC explicitly targets full-time workers.51 Finally, 
there is a natural tendency for business groups to push to 
expand eligibility for any hiring credit, providing broader tax 
relief for businesses rather than targeting the policy explicitly 
on job creation.52 Thus, it is important to implement a hiring 
credit that keeps the focus on new job creation. 
There are a number of proposals to reduce the costs of 
worker subsidies. These include ideas for structuring state 
EITCs differently and reducing costs per job created by 
improving targeting. Federal EITC payments go to families 
well above the poverty line, to avoid phasing out benefits 
too quickly. In addition, individuals with high wages but 
low hours worked may be eligible for the EITC, because it 
is based on income during the year, but there is little ratio-
nale for policies to transfer income to high-wage individu-
als.53 To address these problems, one proposal suggests a 
“wage-based” EITC that pays higher benefits the higher 
the share of full-time work in a family (MaCurdy 2004). 
A wage-based EITC could provide similar incentives and 
benefits for low-wage workers and greater work incentives 
for high-wage workers, while lowering program expenses 
by reducing benefits for families with high-wage and part-
time workers. A drawback to this alternative is that it poses 
greater administrative challenges than would a simple 
supplement to the federal EITC. 
Another possibility is to use a more narrowly targeted 
version of an EITC. For example, the Self-Sufficiency Project 
(SSP) in Canada focused on long-term welfare recipients 
and imposed a minimum work requirement of 30 hours per 
week, both of which should have vastly reduced the number 
of people who received the benefit without changing their 
behavior. Indeed, about one in two of those receiving SSP 
benefits enter employment because of the program, whereas 
for EITC, the ratio is about one in 20 (Bartik 2001). Clearly, 
a sizable increase in the ratio of the number of beneficiaries 
who change their behavior relative to the number who sim-
ply get the benefits of the program without changing their 
behavior could result in radically lower costs per job created 
than some of the estimates for the EITC discussed above. 
Finally, a state (or local) EITC may have a larger effect 
than might be suggested simply by the dollar amounts of 
the state EITC benefits. In particular, we know that EITC 
take-up is high but below 100 percent (80 to 86% accord-
ing to Scholz 1994). It is possible that a state EITC induces 
some of those eligible for the federal EITC to take it up, 
thus increasing the incentive effects of the federal pro-
gram at relatively low cost. Indeed San Francisco’s EITC 
(Working Families Credit) was explicitly intended to boost 
participation in the federal EITC, in part by publicizing 
the federal EITC and in part by increasing the incentive to 
apply for the federal EITC. (There is, as yet, no evaluation 
of whether the program increased take-up.)54 
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Policy Recommendations
California faces high unemployment and weak job growth 
as a result of the recent recession. But California also has 
a long-term unemployment problem. In assessing hiring 
credits and worker subsidies, short- and long-term consid-
erations play an important role. In the short term, when 
the problem is extraordinarily high unemployment, it is 
likely that hiring credits would have larger employment 
effects than worker subsidies, with lower (and possibly 
much lower) costs per job created. Given the state’s bud-
get crisis, the criterion of cost per job created is obviously 
central. In addition, hiring credits are likely to be more 
effective at increasing the employment of those recently 
unemployed than are worker subsidies. And, finally, hiring 
credits are likely more effective during an economic down-
turn. Thus, for addressing job creation in the short term, 
hiring credits are probably the best policy choice.
In the long term, however, other considerations come 
to the fore. These include the greater certainty regarding 
the effects of worker subsidies, the re-emergence of greater 
interest in the income distribution and other policy con-
cerns as the economy recovers, and the lower effectiveness 
of hiring credits in increasing the employment of the “hard-
to-employ.” As a consequence, worker subsidies in the form 
of a state EITC should, in the long term, figure more promi-
nently in the state’s arsenal of job creation policies. 
It is important to keep in mind that this report consid-
ers only the evidence on direct job creation policies: hiring 
credits and worker subsidies. The possibility that some 
indirect policy is more effective has not been completely 
ruled out or tested, based on a thorough review of the evi-
dence. Nonetheless, with an appropriate understanding of 
this potential limitation, some specific policy recommen-
dations regarding job creation policies emerge:
• In the short run, if state policymakers want to spend 
money on job creation, they should use hiring credits— 
while understanding that the effects are likely to be 
positive but modest relative to the overall effects of the 
recession and that the costs of countering the recession 
through hiring credits are high.
• To be most cost-effective, a hiring credit should focus on 
the recently unemployed. It should create incentives for 
new employment rather than increases in the work hours 
of existing employees. And it should use simple rules and 
a relatively low hurdle for employers to claim the credit. 
The state’s current New Jobs Credit may well be too lim-
iting: It does not target the recently unemployed specifi-
cally, it applies only to small firms, and the credit may be 
too low (at least relative to the current-dollar equivalent 
of the federal New Jobs Tax Credit used in the 1970s). 
• In the long term (that is, when the state’s economy and 
budget situation improve), California should give serious 
consideration to establishing a worker subsidy program 
in the form of a state EITC.
• The state might best follow many other states and specify 
the EITC as an add-on to the federal EITC. However, 
there is merit to considering an EITC that rewards 
full-time work, perhaps by imposing minimum hours 
requirements, so as to enhance the employment effects. 
• To be better prepared to counter future recessions—
which will occur—California should enact a hiring credit 
that remains on the books permanently but that more 
aggressively rewards the hiring of unemployed workers 
during economic downturns, and “turns off” during bet-
ter economic times. 
As we have seen, neither hiring credits nor worker 
subsidies could, at any plausible level of spending, make 
more than a modest dent in countering the lingering labor 
market effects of the recent recession. But there is a good 
chance that a hiring credit could make that dent at a mod-
erate cost. 
Perhaps the most important policy recommendations 
here concern planning for a time when the state’s finances 
are improved—but before the next recession hits, as it 
inevitably will. Looking ahead, there are good reasons for 
the state to enact its own EITC—as many other states have 
done. And establishing a hiring credit program that kicks 
in automatically when the economy does slow down can at 
least cushion the state against the type of blow it has suffered 
recently.  ●
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Notes
1 The higher unemployment rate in California is not attribut-
able to demographic differences between California and the rest 
of the country. (Of course, even if it were, that would not imply 
that the state should not consider policies to increase employ-
ment and lower the unemployment rate.) California’s population 
includes a much higher share of Hispanics, a somewhat lower 
share of blacks, a lower share of whites, and a higher share of 
Asians. The unemployment rate differential appears for each 
group and is in fact largest for whites. If the U.S.-California gap 
were attributable instead to California’s having a higher repre-
sentation of groups with high unemployment rates, there would 
be no unemployment gap for these separate groups. The conclu-
sion that demographics do not account for California’s higher 
unemployment rate was confirmed by a regression analysis 
using Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group files 
for 1992–2007, which showed that the probability that a labor 
force participant was unemployed was higher in California than 
in other states and that this gap was not reduced by accounting 
for race, ethnicity, age, or education.
2 When hiring credits are designed to encourage job creation—
that is, net new hiring—they are sometimes referred to as “job 
creation tax credits.” This report uses the more generic label 
“hiring credit” but emphasizes the importance of designing hir-
ing credits to encourage new hiring, rather than simply subsidiz-
ing hiring that would have occurred without the credit. 
3 One form of direct job creation policy that is not covered in this 
report is increases in direct employment by the public sector. Pub-
lic employment is expensive. Although hiring credits and worker 
subsidies try to spur job creation by changing the marginal cost 
of, or marginal return to, work, public employment requires pay-
ing the entire cost of employing the worker. This may well explain 
why there is no movement toward creating public sector jobs—in 
California or at the federal level—as part of either a short-term 
response to the recession or a long-term employment strategy, 
with the exception of youth programs. This contrasts with hiring 
credits and worker subsidies, both of which are used extensively at 
the federal and state levels, and both of which are or have been the 
focus of recent proposals in California. 
4 The list of proposed policies is far more extensive. See http://
arc.asm.ca.gov/cajobs/?p=solutions, http://cssrc.us/publications.
aspx?id=7554, http://senweb03.sen.ca.gov/focus/agenda2010/
legislation.aspx, www.calchamber.com/governmentrelations/
pages/jobcreators.aspx, and http://images.emaildirect.com/cli-
ents/govpressoffice847/SOTSJobsandEconomyPackage.pdf. One 
might also add training and workforce preparation to the list. 
However, much of the return to training and education comes in 
the form of higher wages for those employed—a worthy goal but 
not one directly related to job creation. The training literature is 
vast. For a thorough review focused on training programs that 
increase employment, see LaLonde (2003) and Card, Kluve, and 
Weber (2010). 
5 Moreover, even some proposals to reduce labor costs could 
actually reduce employment, if they do not reduce costs on the 
margin that affects hiring. For example, changing overtime rules 
to apply after a 40-hour week rather than an 8-hour day (as is 
currently done in California) could reduce employment and 
increase the hours worked of those employed, because such a 
policy change makes it relatively cheaper to have the same work-
ers work longer days. See Hamermesh and Trejo (2000). 
6 Nonetheless, the NJTC created stronger incentives to hire low-
wage workers by applying only to the first $4,200 of wages per 
employee (in 1977 and 1978). 
7 Indeed, although not detailed in the table, some states have 
provisions to “recapture” some of the tax credit if net job cre-
ation falls below the targets for which credits were received. 
8 There is a cumulative spending cap of $400 million for this 
credit; after the cap is reached, the credit will be discontinued 
(www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutftb/Tax_Expenditure_Report_2009.pdf), 
implying that the credit is temporary. However, claims thus far 
total less than one-tenth of this amount (www.ftb.ca.gov/busi-
nesses/New_Jobs_Credit.shtml). 
9 These are discussed fully in Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 
(2000) and Katz (1998). 
10 See, for example, Bartik and Erickcek (2010).
11 Moreover, efforts to avoid windfalls can lead to unintended 
consequences that reduce job creation. For example, paying 
credits for new hires creates incentives for repeatedly firing some 
workers and hiring others to collect the credit; this “churning” 
does not increase employment. And even if policy avoids reward-
ing the simultaneous hiring and firing of workers at a particular 
business establishment, it may be harder to prevent churning in 
the form of hiring at some establishments belonging to a firm 
and firing at other establishments. On the other hand, efforts to 
reduce churning (at the establishment or firm level) by paying 
the credit only for job growth in excess of estimated job growth 
absent the credit is administratively expensive and likely unreli-
able. Moreover, this type of policy design can reward variation 
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in employment, since employment increases are rewarded but 
employment decreases are not penalized. 
12 Despite the many state hiring credit programs in existence 
(partially documented in Table 1), the existing research is nearly 
exclusively about federal programs, and there is very little empiri-
cal research evaluating the effectiveness of these state policies. One 
exception is Bartik and Erickcek’s (2010) evaluation of the Michigan 
Economic Growth Authority Tax Credit Program. This is a strongly 
favorable evaluation, although two qualifications are in order. First, 
the program is quite different from other hiring credit programs. 
It is discretionary (in that the responsible agency evaluates the 
particular proposal in light of its potential benefits and costs), it 
is focused on a subset of industries (mainly manufacturing), and 
it pays credits for a very long period (up to 20 years). Second, the 
evaluation is not based on the kind of before-and-after analysis that 
typifies most research analyzing public policy and is instead based 
on a simulation model that takes many parameters from the exist-
ing literature. In addition, there are some evaluations of small-scale 
hiring credit (or “voucher”) experiments, discussed below. Finally, 
a very recent and preliminary paper (Chirinko and Wilson 2010) 
estimates the effects of state hiring credits, finding some modest 
evidence of positive effects. 
13 The NJTC was claimed for 50 percent of eligible hires, whereas 
rates on the order of 10–20 percent were claimed for hiring cred-
its more focused on the disadvantaged (Bartik 2001; Hamersma 
2005). 
14 There is similar evidence from another randomized experi-
ment discussed in Hollenbeck and Willke (1991).  
15 See Bloom et al. (1994), Farkas et al. (1984), Gueron and Pauly 
(1991), Hamersma (2008), and Katz (1998). Bartik (2001, Ch. 1)  
suggests that these other efforts in support of hiring credit 
programs may be the mechanism that helps to overcome stigma 
effects, by providing information to employers that the workers 
are more productive than their “stigmatizing characteristics” 
might suggest.
16 See Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000).
17 The NJTC attempted to create incentives for new hiring in a 
simple way—by paying the credit for firms in which employment 
increased by more than 2 percent. There was also a maximum 
credit of $100,000 per firm.
18 Bishop (1981) suggests that these industries may be particu-
larly sensitive to hiring credits, because capital equipment depre-
ciates quickly and labor turnover is high. 
19 Perloff and Wachter (1979) conclude that “the New Jobs Tax 
Credit may have shifted the distribution of the rate of growth 
of employment” (p. 178). Bishop (1981) is firmer in drawing 
conclusions but acknowledges that “Perhaps the NJTC variable 
is capturing other exogenous forces that are inducing contempo-
raneous employment increases . . . in the sectors studied” so that 
“the conclusion that NJTC is having major effects on employ-
ment and prices must remain tentative until better data or more 
periods of observation become available” (p. 240). 
20 Indeed, Bartik and Bishop have earlier described the evidence 
more cautiously. Bishop’s (1981) reservations were noted in the 
previous footnote. And Bartik (2001) wrote that “The NJTC may 
have created as many as 700,000 new jobs” (p. 226), indicating 
that the 700,000 figure was an upper bound, a qualification Bar-
tik and Bishop (2009) omit when they write “Formal evaluations 
suggest that the 1977–78 NJTC was quite successful, creating 
700,000 jobs by February 1978 and probably many more by 
December 1978” (p. 9). 
21 “Without children” means that there are no children who 
qualify the family for the higher EITC payment; this is based 
on which parent the child lives with for how much of the tax 
year. Similarly, the text often refers to those without children as 
“ineligible” for the EITC, even though they can get a very small 
credit if they are between ages 25 and 64. 
22 Indeed, the main reason for the popularity and increasing gen-
erosity of the EITC in recent decades is probably this pro-work 
incentive that it generates, which, along with welfare reform, was 
intended to shift the nation’s income-support policies toward 
those that encouraged, rather than discouraged, work (see 
Blank, Card, and Robins 2000).
23 A partial listing of the relevant literature on the federal 
EITC includes Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Eissa and Lieb-
man (1996), and Keane and Moffitt (1998). The only exception 
to the evidence of positive employment effects is Cancian and 
Levinson (2005), who do not find evidence that the increase in 
Wisconsin’s EITC for families with three children increased 
the employment of single mothers in this group. Neumark and 
Wascher (forthcoming) study state EITCs. Extensive literature 
reviews of the effects of the EITC are provided in Hotz and 
Scholz (2003) and Hoffman and Seidman (2003).
24 Key references are Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Eissa and Liebman 
(1996), and Hoffman and Seidman (2003).
25 This expansion raised the phase-in rate for families with one 
child from 18.5 percent to 34 percent and for families with two 
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or more children from 19.5 percent to 40 percent. It also intro-
duced the small credit for families with no children. 
26 See Keane and Moffitt (1998), Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 
(1995), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) for estimates for 
women and Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) for total estimates. 
27 It is unlikely that the EITC has much effect on married women 
without children. It may have adverse effects on single women 
without children who may be less skilled and who face increased 
competition from single women with children who are induced 
to enter the labor market because of the EITC. 
28 For example, Scholz and Levine (2001) report that over 60 per-
cent of EITC benefits go to taxpayers in families below the 
poverty line. And Neumark and Wascher (2001, forthcoming) 
find that state EITCs—because of their positive labor supply 
effects—lead to more families earning their way out of poverty 
(or extreme poverty, defined as one-half the poverty line); with 
the additional income supplement from the EITC, they are made 
even better off. There is similar evidence from other worker sub-
sidies discussed in Blank, Card, and Robins (2000), with family 
income rising by substantially more than cash assistance for the 
most effective programs. 
29 See Rothstein (2008), Leigh (2010), and Neumark and Wascher 
(forthcoming).
30 The employment declines among the latter group are unlikely 
to be as large as the employment increases among single moth-
ers, because those without children are likely to find even low-
wage work more attractive than not working. 
31 In fact, in simple, stylized cases, for the same percentage 
subsidy to hiring or employment, the quantitative effects on 
employment (and wages) are predicted to be identical. 
32 There is a sizable potential cost to taxpayers as a whole, 
although not to employers per se, from overclaiming of the EITC 
when children are claimed on tax returns but did not reside 
with the filer for the one-half year required by law. Hoffman and 
Seidman (2003, Ch. 7) discuss evidence suggesting that little of 
the overclaiming is fraudulent and summarize policy changes to 
reduce overclaiming. 
33 For examples, see www.tax.state.ny.us/pdf/2009/fillin/inc/
it215_2009_fill_in.pdf for New York, www.iowa.gov/tax/
forms/1040AShortBooklet09.pdf for Iowa, and http://forms.
marylandtaxes.com/current_forms/resident_booklet.pdf (p. 9) 
for Maryland.
34 However, the ability to easily create incentives for new hiring 
just because unemployment is high should not be overstated. 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey shows that, even during a recession, there are a 
lot of firms doing a lot of hiring. 
35 This is attributable to substantial employment declines in 
industries with a large share of males, in particular construction 
and manufacturing, in which the combined employment decline 
was about as large as the overall decline (from 2006 to 2009).
36 Nonetheless, because the EITC induces some people to enter 
the labor market, it may change the composition of who is 
employed and could therefore still achieve some of its income 
distribution goals. 
37 The converse is also true: When labor markets are much 
tighter and unemployment is low, hiring credits may be quite 
ineffective at increasing employment, resulting, instead, mainly 
in higher wages. 
38 This may be the rationale for the HIRE Act’s focus on reward-
ing hiring of the unemployed or those entering or reentering the 
labor market. 
39 For both hiring credits and worker subsidies, a longer working 
paper (Neumark 2011) provides more detail on the sources of 
these estimates and some guidance as to which estimates within 
these ranges are more plausible.
40 In particular, policies that keep more people employed during 
an economic slowdown may help preserve workers’ skills, which 
can mean higher wages and higher employment down the road. 
There is evidence of this kind of effect (in the opposite direction),  
which documents long-run deleterious effects on employment 
from time out of the labor force, whether due to high minimum 
wages during one’s youth (Neumark and Nizalova 2007) or to 
previous unemployment spells (Mroz and Savage 2006). With 
respect to hiring credits, some research also assesses how long-
lasting the effects of the credits are on affected individuals. Some 
studies find persistent effects on individuals’ employment and 
earnings but others do not (Katz 1998); in any event, the persis-
tence is weak at best. 
41 Economists refer to such stimulative effects as “multipliers.” 
If an unemployed person gains a job, that person spends part of 
his or her income at other firms, leading those firms to increase 
hiring, etc. 
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42 Bartik and Bishop (2009) estimate very large effects via this 
channel that offset more than 75 percent of a hiring credit that 
they propose. This is based on the assumption that each new job 
created generates an addition to GDP equal to the economy-wide 
average labor compensation ($62,000). This seems quite high. 
Surely the estimate is subject to a great deal of uncertainty; and it 
seems that the calculation should be based not on average com-
pensation but instead on a lower level of compensation that might 
be more likely for the workers who benefit from hiring credits. 
43 The report also estimates full-time-equivalent jobs created, 
which can include the effects of converting part-time to full-
time jobs. These estimates range from 2.0 to 5.2 million, imply-
ing costs per full-time-equivalent job of $110,000 to $285,000. 
44 For these alternative estimates, see Council of Economic 
Advisers (2009). There is some ambiguity regarding how to count 
the jobs created by the stimulus (putting aside issues of how to 
estimate these effects). Since jobs are not permanent, some jobs 
created by the stimulus would already have ended by September 
2010, in which case these estimates of costs per job created by 
the stimulus are too high, because they divide the cost of the 
stimulus by the employment differential at a point in time and 
do not include jobs that were created but already ended. The CEA 
report tries to account for this issue by estimating job creation as 
the sum of the employment differentials in each quarter in the 
president’s first term (which roughly coincides with the period in 
which the stimulus is expected to have an effect). This lowers the 
estimate of cost per job created. However, since the job creation 
effects of hiring credits and worker subsidies were calculated 
based on employment at a point in time, rather than on the 
cumulative effects over many periods, the best comparison to the 
job creation costs of the stimulus is with the CBO estimates.
45 The CEA report may appear to address this issue by reporting 
“job-years” created by the stimulus. Indeed, the report says “A 
job-year means simply one job for one year” (Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 2009, p. 3). What job-years actually means in 
this context is the accumulated sum of the employment differen-
tial measured once per year—a calculation that still ignores job 
durations. 
46 As noted above, though, even if the jobs directly created by a 
policy are short term, they may lead to higher employment in 
the long term. 
47 Even the CEA document suggests that the cost per job created 
via government spending is $92,000 and the cost via cutting 
taxes or state fiscal relief is even higher (Council of Economic 
Advisers 2009). 
48 For the November 2010 numbers, see www.edd.ca.gov/
About_EDD/pdf/urate201011.pdf. The assumption of no other 
changes is not completely realistic. Typically, when job growth 
strengthens, some people who had previously given up look-
ing for work reenter the labor force and look for work, in which 
case the unemployment rate would decline by less than would 
be predicted simply by the growth in jobs. Nonetheless (and for 
this reason), growth in the number of jobs is a better gauge of 
economic recovery than is the change in the unemployment rate 
(see Kwok, Daly, and Hobjin 2010). 
49 The longer accompanying working paper (Neumark 2011) 
provides a lengthier discussion of policy considerations. 
50 And increasing employment rather than hours worked will do 
more to reduce expenditures on Unemployment Insurance.
51 In contrast, Bartik and Bishop’s (2009) proposal calls for a 
hiring credit that is simply a percentage of payroll, because, they 
argue, “We want to provide incentives for hours increases as well 
as net additions to employment” (p. 12). 
52 Lorenz (1995) discusses the case of the TJTC, which was 
intended to reduce windfalls (and to relieve the administrative 
burden on employers) by mandating ongoing program evalua-
tion with reporting to Congress on the credit’s effectiveness in 
increasing employment among targeted groups. Lorenz argues, 
however, that, via the oversight process, interest groups distorted 
the credit into “a windfall for businesses that hire large numbers 
of low wage workers” (p. 270). 
53 Better targeting could also reduce the labor supply disincen-
tives associated with the EITC for high-income families that are 
still eligible (MaCurdy 2004). 
54 See Flacke and Wertheim (2006) for a discussion of the Work-
ing Families Tax Credit. See Avalos and Alley (2010) for infor-
mation on unclaimed federal EITC payments in California. 
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